CHAPTER 9

Introduction
A 'right' of secession?
Self-governing status for Karabakh
Karabakh and international status
Constitutional status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
International status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Future status of Georgia
Regions 'A' and 'B'
Flags and emblems
'Titularisation'
Language
Electoral process
Right of free movement
Monetary policy
Representation in sporting competitions
Refugees/displaced persons
Military arrangements
Law enforcement
Lachin and the Corridor
Territorial adjustment and Gali district
A High Representative?
National monuments and public corporations
Beyond Dayton and Ghali
The Aland Islands
Andorra
San Marino
Association
Discrimination

Reflections on Recommendations
"It is dangerous to use mechanically settlement plans which had justified themselves in one region for settling other conflict situations" [1] (Gennadiy Tarasov, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, 6 January 1998)

INTRODUCTION
There are many political scientists, linguists and historians who are specialists on the Caucasus, but not many lawyers. In recent years many commentaries have been written on the tragic events that have beset the region, but, I am afraid, there has been very little detailed analysis of exactly how constitutional settlements in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be reached. I believe that the next 18 months will prove to be a defining moment in the negotiations. Either a settlement will be reached during this period or such may never be reached. It is a sad fact of life that, after a certain period, the will/desire to 'confront' the same faces disappears, discussion is exhausted and courtesy, inevitably, becomes strained after so many false dawns. The international community should, I think, pause and consider such an 'eventuality'. Cyprus has demonstrated that the 'antagonists' eventually drift apart. I feel, therefore, that if solutions are to be found there needs to be a lot of very specific and direct negotiations over this coming period. Boldness will be required. For those who choose to concentrate on minutiae, instead of the central issues, will fail.
What do these recommendations provide? Certainly they are not intended to provide 'blueprints'. The function of these recommendations is to inspire debate and discussion. Georgia and Azerbaijan currently do not exercise any de facto control over Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Personally, I do not believe that it is either necessary or in their best interests if any of these 'three', merely, secede from Georgia or Azerbaijan. The 'three1 are all 'victims' of geography. Even if the international community recognised Abkhazia, dejure, as an independent state, Abkhazia would still border Georgia. The same applies to the other two. The 21st century will prove not the zenith of the nation state concept, but as the dawn of a new type of international relationship:orders will no long matter; trade will be free; government will be multifarious and on many different levels; there will probably be a single international language, English; continents rather than countries will be people's 'homes'. This will have an enormous effect on nation states and the various peoples that live within them. I rather suspect that, in thirty years time, nation states will be nothing more than 'shop windows' within which 'reside' many different 'products' (cultures). The most important thing in this 'English-speaking world', therefore, will be to preserve one's local identity.
The Caucasus needs desparately to be at peace. It is imperative that Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Abkhazians, Ossetians (etc.) come to realise the true potential of a Caucasian Home (see Chapter 12). Georgians and Azerbaijanis should realise, therefore, that to regain their 'lost' territories should not be at someone else's expense, but in order to gain, for themselves, the Caucasus. Partnership will be the watchword. The hand of friendship could, very quickly, bind Abkhazians-Ossetians/ Georgians together, as it could also bind Armenians/Azerbaijanis together. The important thing for all should be an understanding of, 'what can I do?'.
It will take many years to heal the 'sulphurous' wounds that the events of the last decade (if not earlier) have left behind. One should not, therefore, be expecting to resolve all disagreement overnight. Dialogue as well as patience will have to prevail long after any settlement. Recognition that some aspects of 'separation' could, in time, lead to union, rather than separation, should be 'recognised'.

A 'RIGHT' OF SECESSION?
Should the 'three' be entitled to secede from Georgia and Azerbaijan? I believe 'entitled' is the wrong word here, for in truth, de facto, they have seceded. The more germane question is whether they should be 'permitted' to secede de jure.
What benefits does independence provide? Actually not many. Independence generates only political/economic/social 'isolation'. One should recognise that it is this very 'isolation' that has encouraged the establishment of so many trans-national economic, social and political organisations. Human beings are fairly predictable, conventional, uncomplicated creatures, both in the individual and collective aspect. Take the individual aspect. We don't like/seek the isolation that living on our own provides, we don't like/seek the isolation that remaining single provides: most of us prefer to live in towns/cities rather than the desolate wastes of the 'Arctic'.
The same is true for our collective aspect. We have chosen not (individualist) anarchy, but civil society; we have chosen government to serve and, hopefully, protect us; we have chosen politicians as our 'guardians' even if they are, usually, singularly successful in disappointing us. It is ironic that in the last 50 years, as most of the world's empires have collapsed, that we have managed to create/found so many new structures. Even the former imperial powers have felt the 'chill-winds' of isolation, of being outside the club (of not being liked/having no friends). This is the interdependent world we now live in. So why should the 'three' be any different? Should our existence only be judged upon whether we can attend the General Assembly or not? I don't think so. Secession is not a panacea, as the fall of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has demonstrated. We should not be seeking 'oases' in the desert: for ultimately the water that breaks our thirst will dry up.

SELF-GOVERNING STATUS FOR KARABAKH
Why have I advocated 'self-governing' status for Nagorno-Karabakh? I do not believe the Karabakh Armenians will accept anything less than this. When I visited the region, in the spring of 1996, I was struck by the level of reconstruction work already complete. Indeed, walking around the capital Stepanakert one would have hardly known that a major conflagration had taken place. Nagorno-Karabakh had, even then, a fully functioning government and administration. It seemed to be fairly financially fluid (probably even more than Armenia). In the light of all this and their very real hostility to resume any kind of close, working relationship with Baku, it is impossible to conceive of any situation in which, finally, they would accept anything less than self-governing status. I believe that, just like the Serbs in Sarajevo (see Chapter 10), they would rather abandon what they view as their historical 'Artsakh', than live directly (and that is the crucial word here) under Baku's jurisdiction. If Karabakh was forced to be subordinate to Baku again, I believe the prospects for a lasting peace (even peace in the short-term) would be zero. It would not be very long before the events of 1988-1994 were repeated all over again and I fail to see how that is in the interests of either side, let alone the region's?
Naturally, I did consider the possibilities of recommending a federal republic of Azerbaijan (although I am not sure that this would be acceptable in Baku). However, 1 considered that such a 'federation' would be in name only. I did not feel that Baku would be willing to provide Nagorno-Karabakh with sufficient powers to make the 'suggestion' workble. Indeed, I am not even convinced that Karabakh would, under such a system, be given even the same 'rights' as it had when an Autonomous Oblast during the Soviet period. Further, if part of a federation, who would form its other constituent parts? What of the rights of the Lezgins in north-eastern Azerbaijan and the Talysh (whose 'leader', Isa Gumbar-ov, has been sentenced to death by the Azerbaijani authorities [2]) in the south-east? Would they be given the right to form their own entities within the federation? I considered such a possibility to be highly unlikely. In the light of this, therefore, how sustainable could an 'ethnic' Azerbaijani federation, with a single Armenian 'oasis' within it, be? Answer, not very.

KARABAKH AND INTERNATIONAL STATUS
If Nagorno-Karabakh is to be given the right to self-government, what should its position be on the international stage. I do not think Azerbaijan will, under any circumstances, allow Karabakh to join the United Nations. However, such is not the sole means to expression of one's international identity. Nagorno-Karabakh already has functioning missions/representative offices in other countries. I consider it entirely logical and reasonable to entitle them to set up their own missions abroad. However, I would not recommend missions separate from those in Azerbaijan to be established. I feel the right of States to establish submissions in Stepanakert would provide a useful tool, particularly in the early years after the signing of any political agreement, for Karabakh and Azerbaijan to maintain some kind of indirect contact. It would be wrong to assume that, following any such agreement, relations between the two sides are going to be easy for a few (probably quite a few) years. Therefore, the opportunity for States, with missions in Baku, to establish their own sub-missions in Stepanakert would, at least, facilitate communication between the respective governments. The sub-missions would provide excellent 'intermediaries'.
I believe that Nagorno-Karabakh should be entitled to conclude international agreements/sign treaties with foreign States on equal terms, provided that these agreements do not affect the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the 'parallel' military state of the two. I do not think it would be acceptable for Azerbaijan to sign agreements/treaties on Karabakh's behalf. If they were to be entrusted with this 'responsibility', there would either need to be some form of veto mechanism, subsequent to the agreement(/treaty)'s signing, or direct involvement on the part of Stepanakert which could, under certain circumstances, result in the withholding of signature. I do not prefer these 'latter' alternatives because I feel that they could only be the source of further tension/disagreement between the two sides. There is a very real danger that as a result of the mutual suspicion and hostility that has developed between the two sides during recent years, that elements of 'bad faith' could be employed by Baku to the detriment of Karabakh. I am not suggesting that this would definitely happen, but the consequences of such a 'likelihood' could set the clock back even further. In the meantime, therefore, 'in its place', upon Baku signing any treaty (/agreement), Stepanakert should be given the right to opt in. I accept that this will give rise to complications in the reporting mechanism - most particularly before the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations [3] - but, once again, this should be seen as (perhaps) a first (possible) stage in the restoration of ties between the two. I am sure that, over time, communication between Stepanakert and Baku (at the Foreign Minstry level, for example), on this matter, would increase.

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA
On a constitutional level, Georgia is more problematic than Azerbaijan. It is not difficult to imagine Nagorno-Karabakh as a self-governing entity, even its mountainous geography has assisted it. For Georgia, however, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not the only problems that 'loom' on the horizon. Georgia has, additionally, regions in the south of the country overwhelmingly populated by ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis: 'fortunately', for the most part, living apart. To solve Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not to solve Georgia. It is a country 'weakened' by the fact that its minorities are, in the main, although by no means exclusively, settled in the borderlands with Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Providing extensive rights of autonomy for Abkhazians and Ossetians will only foster calls for the establishment of similar autonomous structures where Armenians and Azerbaijanis are concentrated. It is my very great fear that unless Georgia satisfies these demands it could very soon be sucked into new and more dangerous conflicts. In searching for a constitutional settlement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Tbilisi has a perfect opportunity to settle potential flashpoints 'lying in wait'.
The 'United Republic of Georgia' would contain the aspects of both a federation and confederation. While the relationship between Sukhumi/ Tskhinvali and Tbilisi would assume, predominantly, a confederal nature, Tbilisi's relationship with Region A and Region B would be more similar to that of a federation.
At some stage the question of the division of competences between the centre (as exercised by the Union Government and the Union Assembly) and the Republics/Regions will arise. Both Dayton (Bosnia-Herzegovina) [4] and the Ghali Set of Ideas (Cyprus) [5] provide an interesting guide in this respect. However, I feel that, in a number of areas, the opportunity for more more extensive rights of autonomy, at least for the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia, will have to be addressed.
In Dayton, the responsibilities of the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina are provided in Article 3 of Annex 4 (Constitution). Article 3(1) states:
The following matters are the responsibility of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina: (a) foreign policy; (b) foreign trade policy; (c) customs policy; (d) monetary policy, as provided in Article VII; (e) finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina; (0 immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation; (g) international and inter-Enlity criminal law-enforcement, including relations with Interpol; (h) establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities; (i) regulation of inter-Entity transportation; and (j) air traffic control'.
Article 3(3)(a) states:
'All governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned in this Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be those of the Entities'.
In Ghali, paragraphs 25 and 26 provide:
'(25) The federal government will have the powers and functions listed below. All powers and functions not vested in the federal Government will rest with the two federated states. The federated states may decide jointly to confer additional powers and functions to the federal Government or to transfer powers and functions from the federal Government to the federated states.
'(26) The federal Government will have the following powers and functions: (a) Foreign affairs (the federated states may enter into agreements with foreign Governments and international organisations in their areas of competence. The representation in foreign affairs will reflect the bi-communal nature of the federal republic); (b) central bank functions (including the issuance of currency); (c) customs and the coordination of international trade; (d) airports and ports as concerns international matters; (e) federal budget and federal taxation; (f) immigration and citizenship; (g) defence (to be discussed in connection with the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance [6]); (h) federal judiciary and federal police; (i) federal postal and telecommunications services; (j) patents and trademarks; (k) appointment of federal officials and civil servants (on a 70:30 Greek Cypriot/ Turkish Cypriot ratio); (1) standard setting for public health, environment, use and preservation of natural resources, and weights and measures; (m) coordination of tourism and industrial activities'.
As one can sec, there is a very large degree of commonality between the division of competences, as enshrined in Dayton and Ghali. The rights enjoyed by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, according to my recommendations, would be greater. Additionally, there would be a clear 'separation' of the competences between the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia and the other members of the union. To all intents and purposes, Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be able to establish/ formulate their own, separate, legal systems, and even their own 'foreign policy', although this would be done in close consultation with the State Council.

INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA
Abkhazia and South Ossetia would have the opportunity to sign international agreements. It should be noted that in Dayton, Article 3(2)(d) of Annex 4 states:
'Each Entity may also enter into agreements with states and international organisations with the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly. The Parliamentary Assembly may provide by law that certain types of agreements do not require such consent'.
I do not believe that the highly complex process of adoption/ 'consent', as provided in Article 4(3) of the same Annex [7], should be 'introduced' as part of any final settlement in the 'United Republic of Georgia'. The opportunity for a particular community, as represented in either the House of Peoples or the House of Representatives, to block (subject to due process before the Constitutional Court) any resolution/item of legislation, is, in my opinion, a recipe for both conflict and 'gridlock'. The right of the Republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to conclude international agreements should not be made subject to the permission/ veto of, what would be, I am sure, in effect, another part of the union. It should be noted that Article 3(2)(a) states, however:
The Entities shall have the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighbouring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina'.
International treaties would only have the force of law in Abkhazia and South Ossetia upon 'ratification by their respective Assemblies'. I accept (once again) that this could complicate consideration of Georgia's international 'commitments' before the (United Nations) Human Rights Committee, but, in this condition (as, of course, with Karabakh), I feel the burden of proof should rest not with Tbilisi but with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. I do not believe that 'imposing' international treaties upon these two republics would lead to better human rights observance there. I actually feel that it would be detrimental. 'Imposition' could only provoke new tensions. During what would be fragile times, following the signing of a political agreement, such likelihoods could not assist the process of peacebuilding. The important thing is to avoid the politicisation of UN instruments. I have no doubt that if Abkhazia and South Ossetia were entitled to 'ratify' separately, this would improve ratification and, crucially, enforcement. In fragile societies 'mandatoriness' helps no-one.

FUTURE STATUS OF GEORGIA
There has been much discussion and disagreement about the future constitutional status of Georgia. Without question, there are certain people who would prefer to establish a unitary state. I do not think that there are any circumstances in which this would be acceptable to the Abkhaz/Ossetian sides. The authorities in Tbilisi have concentrated on the formation of a federal republic. While this idea, at first glance, appears attractive, there is the danger that overwhelmingly Georgian-populated regions, such as Tianeti [8], would not be sufficiently distinguishable (despite President Shevardnadze's recent federal(/'confederaP?) pronouncement, see Chapter 6) from Abkhazia/South Ossetia. On the Abkhaz side, in particular, there has been an 'emphasis' on the establishment of a confederal, union state. Here Georgia and Abkhazia would be, constitutionally, regarded as equals. This suggestion is unconscionable to Tbilisi. Of course, 'ideally', Abkhazia would prefer total independence or, at least, 'union' with Russia, whereas South Ossetia still dreams of unification with North Ossetia, and, I suspect, 'parallel' incorporation into the Russian Federation. In consideration of this, it is very difficult to find recommendations which balance the interests of the respective sides. I feel I have come about as close as anyone can to doing this.
Agreement is lacking, also, on the future title of the country. Some in Sukhumi would prefer the Union of Georgia and Abkhazia (I am never sure where this leaves South Ossetia?). Others would be willing to accept, merely, the Union Republic of Georgia. My own preference is the 'United Republic of Georgia'. 'United 'Republics" are not new: consider the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United Republic of Tanzania (a union of Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar) [9]. I much prefer the use of the word 'United' to 'Union'. 'United' suggests that this is what Georgia is. I feel this to be especially important in light of the events of the past decade. If one speaks of a 'union', while this does suggest mutual consent, it does not express sentiments of 'unity' and common purpose. With the country having a title which suggests (moves towards) the same goals/aspirations, I feel an important psychological barrier, from the first instance, would be broken. I do not prefer the term 'Union of Georgia and Abkhazia'. Apart from its seeming exclusion of South Ossetia, I feel it is clumsy: just in the same way as a Union of England and Scotland' would be.
Inspiration for the composition of the 'United Republic of Georgia' derives very much from the frame established under Dayton. According to Article 3 of Annex 4:
'Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (hereinafter 'the Entities')'.
As previously outlined, any 'union state' structure would be inopportune. I, therefore, have come to the conclusion that there needs to be a 'higher', central, authority, if the 'clumsiness' of 'union' statehood is to be avoided. I believe it is important for Georgia to shelter under an 'umbrella': its, 'additional', Republic status addresses this.
While, according to my recommendations, Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be given extensive rights of autonomy, their relationship with Tbilisi would still be very close. While they would have the opportunity, separately, to ratify international treaties, the right would remain with Tbilisi to sign them at the first instance. The Presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would form an important part of the State Council, of which, I suspect, one of its key roles would be the coordination of foreign policy. Abkhazians and Ossetians would participate in both the Union Government and the Union Assembly (and, of course, the central administration). Defence would be coordinated through the Defence Council.

REGIONS 'A' AND 'B'
Why have I provided 'regional' autonomy for Armenians and Azerbaija-nis? This is probably one of the most controversial elements of my proposals.
I fear that Georgia is vulnerable to constant political manipulation from the outside. I think there is a real danger of certain forces using the regions in southern Georgia, populated largely (in some areas overwhelmingly) by Armenians and Azerbaijanis, to foment new conflict. I am aware, also, and crucially, of the movements to establish autonomy in these regions [10]. In truth, I am of the opinion that it is better to provide such rights of autonomy in these regions (in order to help establish feelings of mutual trust and respect) 'earlier', than allow the issue to smoulder, only perhaps to 'explode' at a given moment. I think regional autonomy for the, so-called. Regions A and B, also, has an Abkhazian/ Ossetian dimension. I feel that if autonomy was only provided to them, there would be the real danger of an over-emphasis (this has probably already happened) towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia needs to build partnerships with its other peoples. If Abkhazia and South Ossetia, only, are provided with autonomy, I believe Georgia will be 'hampered', in its development, by a certain 'paranoia' towards these regions. There needs to be a Toil', so that Abkhazia and South Ossetia can not merely, in the future, manipulate, unilaterally, their status vis-a-vis that of Georgia's. Autonomy for the Armenian-populated districts of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda (Region A), and for the Azerbaijani-populated districts of Marneuli, Bolnisi and Dmanisi (Region B) would assist this.

FLAGS AND EMBLEMS
I don't think anybody in Georgia or Azerbaijan would deny the 'three' the right to their own, separate, constitution. Indeed, this would appear to be a condition precedent to any settlement in either country. More problematic, however, is the question of the portrayal of the Azerbaijani/ Georgian flag, national anthem, state emblem and other symbols. I believe there is a real danger that this issue could be 'over'-politicised. In my opinion, it would not help either side, nor future relations, if, for example, Tbilisi were to insist on Sukhumi and Tskhinvali portraying the Georgian flag on government buildings. I have seen for myself the reality of'this1 in north-eastern Estonia. There the local authorities are reluctant to portray the Estonian flag (if any Estonian flag is portrayed, it is usually the old Soviet Estonian one). When I was in Narva and Sillamae to see the May Day celebrations in 1996,1 was struck by the extent to which the local police's attempts to fly the Estonian flag, from 'private' dwellings, proved to be in vain: the flags themselves promptly being torn down.
Flags, anthems and emblems can generate a lot of emotion and I think it is important to avoid providing the 'excuse' for this. Regarding republican flags, it should be noted that the central (republican) authorities would not have the right to prevent local authorities/inhabitants in towns/villages populated by Azeris/Georgians from portraying the State flag. Similarly, the central/local authorities, even in cities/towns with a mixed population, would not have the right to limit/prevent the portraying of State flags where the local population wished them to be portrayed. Of course, there is a real danger that such a right could lead to the 'sectorisation' of such towns/cities, as in Northern Ireland. Here it would be the responsibility of all concerned, particularly the central (republican) authorities, to ensure that such didn't occur. However, I do not think the portrayal of flags will, ultimately, make any difference in this regard. One should not become too principled when one talks about the portrayal of flags. After all, I don't think the Georgian flag has ever been seen in Akhalkalaki/Ninotsminda districts (Region A).

'TITULARISATION'
Why should the Presidents of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh be Abkhazian, Ossetian and Armenian respectively? Is it appropriate to regard the three republics as 'homelands' of these three nationalities? I would accept entirely that, at first glance, particularly to any Georgian/Azerbaijani, such 'recognition' might appear partial. However, if there is to be a settlement in these regions, there needs to be some form of 'guarantee' to ensure that the three peoples have an adequate opportunity to govern and be represented within a country where they form a 'minority', albeit a concentrated one. This is in no way intended to negate the rights of ethnic Georgians/Azerbaijanis in the 'three'.
The 'demographic' nature of South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, were all the 'refugees' to return, would, almost certainly, ensure the permanent election of an ethnic Ossetian/Armenian. In this sense, one could argue that the process of local 'titularisation', in my recommendations, is unnecessary: but where would this leave the Abkhazian people? For the chances of an ethnic Abkhazian being elected in any 'reconstituted' Republic of Abkhazia, according to a standard election process, would be slim.
While recognising the right, only, of an Abkhazian/Ossetian/Armenian to be President of their respective republics, the republican governments should adequately reflect the ethnic make-up of the republic. Thus Georgians, who constituted approximately one-third of the population of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast in 1989, would have no fewer than 5 ministers within the South Ossetian government. Azerbaijanis, who constituted approximately one-quarter of the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in 1989, would have no fewer than 5 ministers within the Karabakh government. Once again, I would accept, Abkhazia would be the odd-one-out. Georgians, who constituted a little under a half of the population of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic in 1989, would, according to my recommendations, have no fewer than 5 ministers in the Abkhazian government. Of course, it should not be forgotten that, in each republic, at least one of the two Deputy Prime Ministers would be an ethnic Georgian/Azerbaijani. Consider the Ghali Set of Ideas. According to para. 38, the council of ministers of the federal government would be based on a ratio, Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot, of 7:3. The paragraph continues:
'One of the following three ministries, that is foreign affairs, finance or defence, will be allocated to a Turkish Cypriot minister'.
It is implied that the president and vice-president will also come from separate communities (paras. 36 and 38; cf. para. 37: 'for the initial eight years'). Of course, this 'precedent' does not justify my approach with Abkhazia. In truth, the Abkhazian question is not 'amenable' to 'precedent', but we should not be stymied from introducing new concepts/ ideas where special cases arise (viz. Dayton).
The same ratios (in the main) have been used for the 'three's', respective, assemblies and civil services.

LANGUAGE
Language and its use is always an emotive issue. I have found it a particularly difficult matter while formulating my recommendations on Georgia.
I truly believe that any country needs a 'common' spoken tongue, a language of interethnic communication. Without this, I feel a State has little future. Once there is no basis for mutual communication, suspicion, resentment and mistrust follow. In consideration of this, I think it is essential that the 'United Republic of Georgia' have a single state language: Georgian. To suggest that Georgian should have effect in Abkhazia is not to suggest that it should take priority over other languages, particularly Abkhazian. It is merely a recognition of the existence of an ethnic Georgian population in the region who should not be denied the right to use their native tongue in the 'public domain'. If Georgian were not an official language in Abkhazia, how would its ethnic Georgian population be able to communicate/liaise, with ease (if at all), with the central/local (republican) authorities? While one could perfectly legitimately argue that Georgian does not need to be an official language in order for these rights to be ensured, I do think that any doubts/fears, as to this, need, from the first instance, to be avoided.
Right or wrong, the Abkhazian people constituted a relatively small share of the pre-war population - Georgians nearly an absolute majority. In such circumstances, following the return of 'refugees', it would not be practicable for what could still be such a minority to, possibly, deny a much larger group their fundamental rights.
Of course, in Abkhazia, the Russian language could be used as the language of inter-ethnic communication. However, Abkhazians should know, as well as anybody, that Tbilisi would never accept such a possibility.

ELECTORAL PROCESS
The system of election to the 'three's' assemblies, I believe, is novel. The matter of ensuring adequate representation for all groups is always difficult in such circumstances. The history of Northern Ireland has proved how easy it is to manipulate, or gerrymander, political boundaries to the advantage of a particular 'denomination'. In the case of South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, I am sure that, if drawn 'objectively', the 'equivalent' representation of ethnic Georgians/Azeris, in the assemblies, would not be so different to the ratios I have given: but can we be sure of objectivity? In the light of conflict, I believe it is essential to ensure, prior to the conducting of the relevant elections, the ethnic makeup of the assemblies. This is how, therefore, I arrived at the idea of the list for each community. In any assembly election each voter would have only one vote. Having registered as the member of a specific ethnic group, each voter would only be able to vote for candidates from the list which 'represented' their ethnic group. Candidates from each community, be it Armenian/Azerbaijani or Ossetian/Georgian, would, therefore, be elected from a different list. The same would apply in Abkhazia: 'ensuring' that its assembly would even have two ethnic Greeks and two ethnic Ukrainians. An aspect of this process would be the formation of separate political parties for each ethnic group (list): although, of course, the right to stand as an independent candidate would be guaranteed. I do not think it practicable to expect the relevant ethnic groups to operate/ 'fight' under the same 'banner'/political platform. However, as I have indicated, I would hope that over time, during the period of 'restoration', contact between the 'equivalent' parties could be established on all sides, ultimately leading to joint platforms, if not 'joint' lists.

RIGHT OF FREE MOVEMENT
Why should Abkhazia/South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh be entitled to regulate (im)migration into (and out of) their respective republics? I am afraid the legacy of both Soviet and union republic policy on this question is not a happy one. A deliberate policy was employed by Moscow during the Soviet period of settling thousands (often hundreds of thousands) of ethnic Slavs into republics such as Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzstan. The same policy was applied in Russia itself, particularly in the north Caucasus, if not through deportation also, to reduce the share of the local, 'indigenous', population. Republics/ regions that did not experience such 'settlement', most especially Armenia and Dagestan, were often regarded as of little 'threat' to the (Soviet) Union. On a micro, union republic, level, a similar policy of titularisa-tion, particularly in Georgia and Azerbaijan was applied. A policy of settlement was introduced to reduce the proportion of ethnic Armenians living in Karabakh and ethnic Abkhazians in Abkhazia. Thus, the 1989 Soviet census confirmed that the ethnic Abkhazian population had fallen to 17.8% (Georgians 45.7%, Armenians 14.6%, Russians 14.2%). Irrespective of the rights or wrongs (or 'entitlements') of pursuing such a policy, it has left its mark [11].
In consideration of this, I feel it is important to provide the 'three' with the right to determine who settles in their respective republic. I do appreciate that there are certain dangers in doing this. Naturally, a 'reverse'-policy could be implemented by their respective governments, with the deliberate aim of reducing, artificially, the proportion of ethnic Georgians/Azerbaijanis. I accept entirely that this might happen, but I do, equally, feel that these peoples need security. If they are to be granted 'autonomy', the ethnic effects of this should not be rendered as absurd as the Jewish Autonomous Region in Russia: where today hardly any Jews live (not that many lived there during Soviet times [12]).

MONETARY POLICY
Should the 'three' be entitled to establish their own currencies?
In Karabakh the Armenian currency, the Dram, is used. I believe there are almost no circumstances in which the Armenians in Karabakh would accept the use of the Manat (the currency of Azerbaijan) as legal tender. This causes complications as, I am sure, Baku would, under no circumstances, permit the Dram. I have, therefore, concluded that Karabakh should be given the right to establish its own currency, separate from the Dram. While the operation of 'parallel' currencies within a single country can, undoubtedly, create difficulties, the matter would be eased in the case of Karabakh on account of its self-governing status. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, however, the matter is more problematic.
Could Abkhazia and South Ossetia, merely, issue their own notes and coinage (as in Scotland)? In truth, I fear that if such were 'introduced', the circulation of their Lari (Georgia's national currency), within Georgia proper, would give rise to significant tensions.
Let us assume that I am an ethnic Abkhazian living in Gudauta (Abkhazia). One day I travel to Tbilisi. The only Lari I have on me are 'Abkhazian' Lari. I go to a shop to buy something and they will not accept my 'Abkhazian' Lari. What should I do? Simple: go to a bank and exchange my 'Abkhazian' Lari for the 'Georgian-variety' - but there is more to it than just that. First, if there were a single Central Bank in Tbilisi, how would it be able to regulate the printing of 'Abkhazian' (/'Ossetian') Lari. There is a danger that the management of monetary policy in Tbilisi could be rendered into a major political issue, with the Abkhazians and Ossetians claiming that the Central Bank was starving them of Lari and, thus, impeding the development of their economies. Second, if I exchange my 'Abkhazian' Lari in Tbilisi, what then happens to it? Would it get burnt and 'replaced' (which would prove very costly), or would it get returned to Abkhazia? If returned to Abkhazia, how could it be secured from 'bandits' on the road between Tbilisi and Sukhumi (and what of its use, and practicalities, in other parts of the country)?
'Abkhazian' Lari 'not being accepted in Georgia-proper' could have an enormous impact on relations between the two peoples and their respective governments. (The same applies for South Ossetia.) Personally, I do not think such a policy is sustainable. It would, ultimately, provoke new tensions. In consideration of this, I feel the least bad option would be to offer Abkhazia and South Ossetia the right to introduce their own separate currencies; monetary policy could then be the responsibility of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. This need not affect the proportion of tax revenues that would be paid into the central budget and it would also not affect the right of each republic to decide to confer (after all) the management of monetary policy to Tbilisi - a distinct possibility.

REPRESENTATION IN SPORTING COMPETITIONS
The matter of sporting competitions is an interesting one. Why do I suggest that residents in Nagorno-Karabakh be entitled to choose the country they would like to represent in international sporting competitions and not provide the same for those in Abkhazia and South Ossetia? From the outset, I would like to point out that such a question is, in itself, a red-herring. Ultimately, it is the right of any individual to choose whichever country he/she wants to represent in international sporting competitions, usually upon acquiring that nation's citizenship. Consider, in the case of the UK, our former long jumper, Fiona May. She married her Italian coach, assumed Italian citizenship and has, ever since, jumped for Italy. Karabakh is assisted by the existence of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the international (sporting) stage - North Ossetia, for example, is not a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). I feel the opportunity should, therefore, be given to residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, (hopefully ultimately) both Armenian and Azerbaijani, to freely decide for themselves which country (Armenia/Azerbaijan) they would like to compete for.

REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
The Ghali Set of Ideas provide an interesting insight into the process of return of 'displaced persons'. One important consideration will be the method of return. In this regard, the question of priorities might arise (Ghali, para. 73). Here, those (mainly) displaced persons from Gali District could be treated as first priority (indeed, this has been the 'assumption' during the negotiations). In Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, the town of Khodjaly (overwhelmingly Azerbaijani prior to the war) could be resettled first.
Naturally, the question of compensation arises for those refugees/ displaced persons who do not want to return. While I believe that the 'opportunity' for the provision of some form of compensation should be considered, I do not think it is practicable to expect any such compensation to derive from the authorities in the 'three': cost and a consequent, accentuated/aggravated, economic dislocation would outway any 'advantage'. I feel, therefore, that the international community would have to 'intervene' (if at all) in their place.
Ghali's clauses on resettlement (itself) are useful, but again not directly analogous to the circumstances that may prevail in the 'three'. While the right to return is provided (Ghali, para. 79/80), the prospect of return is not guaranteed (Ghali, para. 84). For those displaced persons whose former homes have been settled by displaced persons from the other community, or where their former property 'has been substantially altered or has been converted to public use, the former permanent resident will be compensated or will be provided an accommodation of similar value'. This is of greatest relevance to Karabakh. In Lachin and Shusha a large number of the Armenians living there today are, themselves, displaced from Azerbaijan (outside Karabakh): principally, from Baku, Sumgait and Gyandzha. If they are not prepared to return to their former homes, where would this leave the displaced former Azerbaijani residents? I do not believe the Ghali Set of Ideas provides a helpful 'precedent' in this regard. I feel that all displaced persons should have the right to return to their former homes, even if these residences are currently inhabited by displaced persons, who may even not have the 'right' to return to their former properties. At first glance this might appear inequitable. However, consider a displaced Armenian family from Sumgait living in Shusha. They will have (broadly-speaking) selected a flat from a number in the city; on the other hand, that same flat might have been the former 'possession' of an Azerbaijani family now seeking to return. In such circumstances, I believe it to be more equitable to provide the displaced (Armenian) family from Sumgait with alternative accommodation (even in Shusha), than to 'permanently displace' the displaced Azerbaijani family. For this to be effective, a period of limitation, to reclaim former property, would have to be introduced for all refugees/ displaced persons. Only in circumstances where it were physically impossible to restore this right, perhaps even more than 'substantially altered or converted', could the right be frustrated.
Annex 7 (Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons) of the Dayton Accord provides for the establishment of an independent Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees. According to Article 11:
'(the) Commission shall receive and decide claims for real property in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the property has not voluntarily been sold or otherwise transferred since 1 April 1992, and where the claimant does not now enjoy possession of that property'.
The claimant may seek the return of that property or 'just compensation' (or even exercise the option of a lease). What I believe is of crucial importance, however, is the matter of the right of title. Unlike in Ghali, in Dayton, a refugee/displaced person may not be precluded from returning to his former property in the event of that property being inhabited by a displaced person who chooses to remain in that property. The implementation of Ghali, I feel, would be severely 'weakened' by the very real danger of the local authorities using its methodology to manipulate not only the nature of settlement, but also the prospects of settlement.
My recommendations provide for the establishment of three international representatives: in Stepanakert, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. Of course, each international representative could, quite easily, be served by a Commission similar to that provided for in Dayton. This is fine. What is more problematic, however, is its composition. I feel that the active participation of appointed members from the Federation and the Repub-lika Srpska (6 out of the 9 members, see Annex 7, Article8(1)) compromises the position of the 'remaining' international representatives. While I would not suggest that the international representatives in the 'three1 should not have good and active communication with the respective authorities, I do believe that it is infinitely preferable for there to be a 'separation' in their function. I am afraid 'good faith' cannot always be anticipated.

MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS
The existing armed forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia provide a highly visible testament to the recent conflicts in these regions. Each, to varying strengths and capabilities, has its own military and military structures. The question of their future, after any settlement, is surely one of the most controversial of all the matters to be considered. Nagorno-Karabakh has, presently, one of the most concentrated stockpiles of heavy weaponry in the world, even if there was a desire (and there isn't) on the part of Stepanakert to withdraw it, it could not be done 'overnight'.
Once again, I think there is a very real danger of matters such as this becoming an unnecessary impediment to a solution. The people of Nagorno-Karabakh need to be able to defend themselves and formulate their own security policy. Nagorno-Karabakh, as a self-governing republic within Azerbaijan, would not facilitate its position as a dejure part of Azerbaijan if it was reliant on the armed forces of Armenia for its security. Stepanakert would never accept the 'good offices' of Baku in this regard. Therefore, I feel that, particularly in the light of the recent conflict, the authorities in Stepanakert should be entitled to maintain their own armed forces. Nagorno-Karabakh will not sign any agreement without such a proviso and I feel that it would be in the interests of Baku if its own military could consult directly with their equivalents in Stepanakert. In time, although I have not recommended this, a Defence Council, similar to that which would function within the 'United Republic of Georgia', could be established. 'Verbal-diplomacy' is preferable to 'tank'-diplomacy'. It is a tragic legacy of the war that, whether there is a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh or not, there will remain a very strong military presence in the region. Recognising this, the important consideration should be how that 'presence' can be mitigated while remaining present.
Paragraph 53 of the Ghali Set of Ideas states:
'The demilitarisation of the federal republic remains an objective'.
I do not think anybody would deny or dispute that 'demilitarisation' should 'remain an objective' in the 'three'. I do feel, however, that this is, just as in Cyprus, a very long way off. After any political settlement, it will be essential for the respective governments of the 'three' to maintain strong armed forces. Such a state should not be regarded, in any way, as an aspect of possible aggression against either Azerbaijan or Georgia, but as an important means of facilitating the security of the local population. I feel the governments in Baku and Tbilisi should, over a period, develop cooperation with these armed forces. There is very considerable scope for this in the 'United Republic of Georgia'. Over a period of time, through the cooperation and dialogue that the Defence Council could promote, the Union Government's defence policy/strategy could make considerable use of the existence of three armies in the country. In this sense, there is no reason why these armed forces (Georgian, Abkhazian, Ossetian) couldn't, in time, be regarded as an expression, 'merely', of ethnicity, rather than confrontation (either previous or present).
The existence of foreign troops/civilians serving in the 'three's' 'self-proclaimed' armed forces has been a matter of considerable claim and counter-claim, most particularly in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia. Whether this is true or not should not obfuscate our consideration of the matter. Dayton is quite explicit, it states in Article 3(1) of Annex la (Agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO Concerning the Status of NATO and its Personnel) that all foreign forces, 'not of local origin, whether or not they are legally and militarily subordinated to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... shall be withdrawn together with their equipment', within 30 days of the signing of the agreement, 'from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina'. While, for the sake of the sustainability of Dayton and Bosnia itself, this provision has proved an important sine qua non, for the purposes of the 'three' a similar provision may prove more problematic. I believe, certainly in the case of the 'Armenian' armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, that it would be impossible to delimit that equipment which is an aspect of Karabakh from that which is an aspect of Armenia. Ultimately, we should consider only the final 'constitution' of the proposed National Guards, rather than their present state. The matter of equipment should not be used as a device to stymie the signing of any agreement. It should be a condition, therefore, that only permanent residents in each of the 'three', prior to the outbreak of hostilities, may serve in their respective National Guards. It would not be appropriate, for example, for ethnic Armenians from the Republic of Armenia to continue serving in the National Guard of Nagorno-Karabakh. Displaced persons, however, should be entitled to serve. Thus, an ethnic Armenian from Baku who decides to remain in Karabakh, after any settlement, should be given the right to serve in its National Guard. For those residents who decide to settle permanently in the 'three', but who were not permanently resident at the time of the outbreak of hostilities, the option to serve should be reserved, but only after a period of permanent residence, which, I would advise, should proceed from the date of their settlement (or signing of the political agreement, if earlier).
Even if agreement is reached on the maintaining of armed forces in the 'three' and upon their 'make-up', the matter of the level and type of weaponry held will remain. The post-Cold War environment has 'necessitated' agreement on defined limits as contained in the relevant articles of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Weaponry, for this purpose, has been subdivided into five categories: 'battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters'. Before any agreement can be signed, it will be necessary to delimit maximum levels not just for the 'three', but for the 'United Republic of Georgia' and the Republic of Azerbaijan as well. Annex Ib of Dayton, (Agreement on Regional Stabilisation) provides us with a guide as to how appropriate 'numbers' could be reached. Article 4(2) states:
The Parties agree that the armaments agreement should be based at a minimum on the following criteria: population size, current military armament holdings, defence needs, and relative force levels in the region'.
Nobody would doubt that arms and arms sales is (regrettably) a large and seemingly very profitable business. The Transcaucasus, which seems to have been used by Russia as a dumping ground for surplus tanks, armoured vehicles etc., will prove to be, in light of the recent conflicts there, a particularly troublesome region to secure agreement. After all, in the rather 'sterile' atmosphere of peace, it is comparatively simple to formulate defined, containable limits for the sake of a hypothetical armed conflict. In the post-settlement environment of the Transcaucasus, as in the Balkans, this is more problematic. A military balance will have to be defined. However, it will be impossible to do this on a country-by-country basis, but instead, as in Bosnia, by way of a holistic 'regional' one.
I am concerned that population size should be a factor in delimitation. A small population cannot, in any way, reveal a region's defence needs. The purpose of the exercise should not be, necessarily, to seek the destruction of existing weaponry, but to ensure that a further arms build-up in the region does not occur. In the present climate in Russia, this will take some doing. While Baselines such as that indicated and outlined in Article 4(3) of Annex Ib may appear attractive, they are difficult to enforce and can risk diplomatic impasses and, in turn, breaches of agreements.
The most important consideration in any Transcaucasian 'armaments agreement' will be future transparency, communication and exchange of information. For that to be facilitated, one should consider the possible application of the terms of Article 2 of Annex Ib. Paragraph (h) calls for the 'immediate exchange of data on the holdings of the five Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe ... weapons categories'.
This could include the sharing of information on the location of heavy weapons (para, (c) provides for 'restrictions on the locations of heavy weapons'), and notification upon their movements (with explanations). In paras, (a) and (f):
'(a) restrictions on military deployments and exereises in certain geographical areas;...
'(f) notification of certain planned military activities, including international military assistance and training programmes'.
Naturally, training programmes should avoid being made on sensitive dates (anniversaries)/locations. The medium/long-term possibility of invitation of senior staff 'from the other side' to such exercises would be a particularly welcome development. Ultimately, a Transcaucasian equivalent of the Defence Council of the 'United Republic of Georgia' could be set up.
Before any Transcaucasian Defence Council could be established, a level of local and international confidence will have had to have been reached. In order to facilitate its attainment and continuation, it will be essential for United Nations weapons inspectors to have been able to have monitored the process of de-deployment. Amongst' the culture of arms that has prevailed for too long in the Transcaucasus, this will prove a mighty challenge. However, I am sure, through good offices, good faith on all sides and a not insignificant degree of trust, stability, rather than the perpetuation of an 'arms race1, could be established.

LAW ENFORCEMENT
Law enforcement and the establishment of local self-defence detachments are an important aspect of any settlement. Confidence is something which will be lacking following the return of 'refugees'. The 'nightmares' that war generates will not permit the respective National Guards of the 'three' to satisfy, for these people at least, the role of law enforcer. Under these circumstances, it is essential that mechanisms are established for localities, in these regions, to be able to set up their own self-defence detachments.
I feel the most important thing in the law enforcement of these regions, after a settlement, will be the commonality of law enforcement. It should not matter, ultimately, what uniform the particular law-enforcer is wearing in any of the 'three'. If I was an Azerbaijani returning to my home in Khodjaly, for example, I would not feel remotely confident if the National Guard of Nagorno-Karabakh were patrolling my neighbourhood. Yet, it would be the responsibility of the heads of these local entities to coordinate law enforcement with their respective Internal Affairs Ministry. Coordination-and cooperation, as well as commonality, are essential.
A few points need to be clarified. First, law enforcement would operate within defined territorial limits. Therefore, an Azerbaijani self-defence detachment operating in Khodjaly would not have 'jurisdiction' in Stepanakert. The National Guard of Nagorno-Karabakh would not be able to exercise its function as law-enforcer in any locality where a local self-defence detachment operated. The same principle would also apply in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, free movement for the respective National Guard should, of course, be maintained. Second, the possibility of ethnic Azerbaijanis (in Karabakh)/ethnic Georgians (in Abkhazia/ South Ossetia) exercising their right to serve in the respective National Guard and function, exclusively, as law-enforcer in localities where members of the National Guard in their customary 'form' are not preferred, should be promoted. Third, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, in those localities where the Armenian population is at least 25%, it will be the responsibility of both the central and local authorities to ensure that a multi-ethnic law-enforcement body is established.
Just like 'demilitarisation', the establishment of police forces in the 'three' should remain an 'objective'. I do feel, however, that this is something that will need to be treated very delicately in the short/ medium term, following any settlement. In my opinion, the future security of the whole population in the 'three' and the enforcement and application of the law, as effected, in good faith, by the relevant republican governments, is incredibly important. The question of the 'type' of law enforcers in the "three', therefore, should not become the dominant issue. Confidence has been shattered and the restoration of such will not be facilitated through the creation of, potentially, monoethnic police forces which would be unable to secure the confidence of any returnees/certain localities. The international community should avoid 'RUCisation'. Ultimately, it is to be hoped that police forces in each of the 'three' could be established, but it is essential that the interim period should be used to encourage cooperation between the respective National Guards (certain aspects of which could increasingly assume the sole function of an emerging police force) and local self-defence detachments (which could equally increasingly, and over a period, assume the same function).
One of Dayton's most welcome 'manifestations' has been the establishment and operation of the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) (as per Annex 11). The 'role and function' of law enforcement in the 'three' will be imperative for the success of the post-settlement environment. There is a real danger that in permitting the establishment of self-defence detachments that they could become removed (/remove themselves) from the 'direction' of the local republican government and become, also, potentially highly threatening, autonomous, little (or perhaps in some cases not so little) armies. Apart from the obvious requirement for professionalism, there must be commonality and consistency in the operation of law enforcement. This is where I believe a small group of 'international police', under UN auspices, could beneficially 'intervene'.
Article 3 of Annex 11 states:
'(1) IPTF assistance includes the following elements, to be provided in a programme designed and implemented by the IPTF Commissioner ... (a) monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organisations, structures and proceedings; (b) advising law enforcement personnel and forces; (c) training law enforcement personnel; (d) facilitating, within the IPTF's mission of assistance, the Parties' law enforcement activities; (e) assessing threats to public order and advising on the capability of law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats; (f) advising governmental authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the organisation of effective civilian law enforcement agencies; and (g) assisting by accompanying the Parties' law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities, as the IPTF deems appropriate'.
While I fully appreciate that, according to my recommendations, the 'implementation' of paragraph (f), the provision of 'effective civilian [my emphasis] law enforcement agencies' may be an impossibility during the early stages, I feel that any 'IPTF' equivalent could have an enormous impact on not just fostering the creation of sustainable and democratic law enforcement bodies (of whatever type), but that such could have a huge effect in promoting confidence among the local population; as well as, of course, (crucially) fostering the transmogrification of law-enforcement from the military to civilian-type.

LACHIN AND THE CORRIDOR
The restoration process in Bosnia has demonstrated the importance of corridors (see Chapter 10). Stepanakert fears physical separation from Armenia. It will not conceive the possibility of becoming an enclave again. I feel my proposal to lease the Lachin Corridor, indefinitely, to Karabakh provides a possible solution to the matter.
The Lachin Corridor would become a part of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Lachin Corridor, in view of its status, would, therefore, not be patrolled by members of the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, but by the National Guard of Nagorno-Karabakh, alongside the contingent of United Nations military observers.
In formulating the 'Lachin Corridor', we should avoid the creation, metaphorically, of the 'Humber effect'. There is a real danger that the Lachin Corridor could effectively cut-off villages, in the Republic of Azerbaijan proper, to the north of the Corridor from those to the south, and vice versa. These localities should not, therefore, be separated like the towns of Hull and Grimsby (in the United Kingdom) were before the construction of the Humber bridge. Such a possibility, where communication could only be effected by 'circumnavigating' Nagorno-Karabakh would be a manifest absurdity. In consideration of this, it is of fundamental importance that free passage is maintained. The ability to cross the Lachin Corridor, from north to south, should be guaranteed. This could be done through the construction of a road (running from north to south) across the Corridor, monitored by both the Karabakh National Guard and United Nations military observers. This road could be regarded as an international highway, similar to that of the Bosphorus [13]. Although compared to this famous international highway, such a 'construction' might appear a 'dwarf, it is an important 'dwarf.
Considerable time has been spent discussing the future status of Lachin during the negotiations. During that time a number of possible alternatives have been proposed. Baku's recommendation for the creation of a 'humanitarian corridor' would have been perfectly feasible (and, perhaps, reasonably acceptable to the Karabakhi side) had it not been for the war. As with Shusha, a lot of lives were lost, on both sides, before it was captured by 'Armenian' forces. I do believe Baku's recommendation that the corridor be manned only by international observers to be a sincere one. However, what is to happen when it comes for them to withdraw. It is the situation at this point that could provoke, perhaps more than anything else, a resumption of the conflict. I admit that, according to my recommendations, it is 'suggested' that the United Nations observers would remain stationed along the corridor in the long term; but at least, on account of the corridor being patrolled by the National Guard of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, there would be the possibility of, over a period, the number of observers being kept to a minimum. Stepanakert has raised the possibility of an exchange of territory, on their part, in return for de facto control over Lachin. However, although the possibility of Kelbadzhar being used as an alternative corridor has been mooted, I think very few people doubt that, in the end, it will be Lachin that will provide the 'umbilical cord' between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. But what type of 'cord'? I believe that the whole of the former Lachinskiy 'fayon should be leased, indefinitely, to Nagorno-Karabakh.

TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENT AND GALI DISTRICT
Territorial adjustment is always difficult. There is usually a 'loser'. I am perfectly aware that the Inguri river, which separates Gali District (in Abkhazia) from Zugdidi District in Georgia proper, has provided a natural boundary between the two 'entities' for centuries. The border '%?tween Gali District and Tqvarcheli/Ochamchire Districts is not so !<p$act. However, I have come to believe that the ancient boundary tietween Abkhazia and Georgia has been rendered, politically at least, *Useless' by the 'Georgianisation' of the local population in Gali District. 'When I refer to Georgianisation, I would like to make myself clear. This is not Georgianisation as the product of assimilation, but the Georgianisation of the population's identity and affiliation. Increasingly, the population of Gali District has come to identify itself as 'Georgian' rather than 'Abkhazian'. Prior to the recent hostilities, many of the local administrations took their orders/instructions from the (exiled) 'Abkhazian' authorities in Tbilisi, rather than from the (de facto) structures in Sukhumi. Gali District had become, de facto, 'beyond' Sukhumi's jurisdiction (/control). I genuinely wonder if this situation is sustainable. I understand and appreciate that history can, at times, be a highly compelling and emotional issue, but, in my opinion, there does some-'\times come a defining moment when history no longer seems relevant. ^Abkhazia minus Gali District would be a stronger Abkhazia. Abkhazia including Gali District, both politically and juridicially, I am not Convinced could survive.
If Gali District's territorial separation from Abkhazia cannot be contemplated in Sukhumi, then possible alternatives will have to be found. One important consideration is to give Gali District, alone within the 'United Republic of Georgia', a special status. Could Gali District become Region C? It conceivably could. Indeed, such a possibility has certain 'advantages'. It could, principally, enable the exiled ('official') Abkhazian authorities in Tbilisi to establish their own governmental structures in 'Abkhazia'. This would avoid the very real dangers of political destabilisation that will flow with the return of these structures to Sukhumi. I am all too conscious of the dangers of a repitition of the events of 1992 (see Chapter 1). However, it would be wrong to suggest that this 'model' is without its own disadvantages. First, I do not believe the existing structurcs-in-exile, in Tbilisi, would accept a continued 'state' of semi-exile in Gali District. There is the distinct possibility that these could continue, in either the short or the long-term, to attempt to wrest control of the remainder of Abkhazia. There is a danger that they could 'manipulate' the returning Georgian population into insurrection/rebellion against what would, at least by then, be recognised as the 'official' authorities in Sukhumi. Second, if Gali District were to become a 'Region C', I am very doubtful that its (own) authorities would be willing to accept powers/competences lower than those of the Republic of Abkhazia, or, third, accept a 'parallel' status to that of the 'existing' Regions A and B. The 'United Republic of Georgia', as a whole, could only fall as a result of competing claims. In consideration of this, Gali District, 1 would strongly recommend, should either remain a part of Abkhazia or not; it cannot exist as Abkhazia's shadow.
Dayton provides useful guidance on the question of the re-location of armed forces in the event of a 'transfer of authority'. It states in Article 4 (3. Phase II) of Annex 1 (Agreement on the Military Aspects of an Air Peace Settlement, 1/2): (This phase applies to those locations where the Inter-Entity Boundary Line does not follow the Agreed Ceasefire Line')
'(a) In those locations in which, pursuant to the General Framework Agreement, areas occupied by one Entity are to be transferred to another Entity, all Forces of the withdrawing Entity shall have forty-five (45) days after the Transfer of Authority to completely vacate and clear this area. This shall include the removal of all Forces, as well as the removal, dismantling or destruction of equipment, mines, obstacles, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions and weapons. In those areas being transferred to a different Entity, in order to provide an orderly period of transition, the Entity to which an area is transferred shall not put Forces in this area ninety (90) days after the Transfer of Authority or as determined by the IFOR Commander. The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall have the right to provide the military security for these transferred areas from thirty (30) days after the Transfer of Authority until ninety-one (91) days after the Transfer of Authority, or as soon as possible as determined by the IFOR Commander, when these areas may be occupied by the Forces of the Entity to which the area is transferred. Upon occupation by the Entity to which the area is transferred, a new Zone of Separation ... shall be established ...'
Although it is feasible to apply such in Gali District (the above section is both clear and systematic) in the event of a transfer of authority, I believe it would be important for the region to be demilitarised and the new 'Zone of Separation' be that territory, in the former Abkhazian ASSR, lying between the Ghalidzga (forming the northern boundary of Gali District) and Inguri rivers. Considering the Inguri river's position as a natural, historical, boundary, between Abkhazia and Georgia, if the Abkhazian side was, ever, to agree a transfer of authority of Gali District from Abkhazia to the Republic of Georgia, it would probably be upon condition that the region be demilitarised. I feel that this would be enormously to the benefit ant/relief of the local population. The wetlands of Gali district have made it a natural arena for guerrilla activities in recent years, with the easy routes of escape that it provides. Naturally, the region could be 'patrolled', at least in the interim, by the international peacekeeping force.

A HIGH REPRESENTATIVE?
One of the most important 'juridicial' devclopments(/precedents) contained within Dayton is the creation of a High Representative in Annex 10 (Agreement on High Representative). The High Representative's mandate which, in the words of Article 2, can be summed up as, to 'a) monitor ... b) maintain ... c) coordinate ... d) facilitate', provides 'him' with the role as 'overseer' of the future development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Article 1(1) recognises, a High Representative will be required in view of the need for the 'continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as necessary; rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free and fair elections'
It is the phrase 'for as long as necessary' that I am unhappy with here. While I would in no way deny the need for a High Representative, according to the conditions in Bosnia, I do not feel that the same would be suitable for any of the 'three'. The very real danger of the High Representative assuming the role of de facto head of state, as he has in Bosnia (see Chapter 10), in any of the 'three', could not be regarded as a welcome development. While I would be the first to admit (as I have) that time and patience will be required before, perhaps, a semblance of 'normality' can be restored, I believe that it should be largely left for the parties concerned to 'mend those broken fences', in their own time, without constantly being 'monitored', 'reported upon' (Article 2(f)), or subject to deadlines. Naturally, there has to be balance, but too much international involvement/pressure risks the danger of the international actors, unwittingly, rendering the institutions they have created meaningless and the politicians little more than exhibits in a zoo. International organisations have an extremely important future role to play in the 'three', but I feel that most of the work can be better done (and achieved) at arms length. This can be demonstrated in my next point.

NATIONAL MONUMENTS AND PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
Prior to the Agreement on the High Representative (Dayton, Annex 10) are the Agreements on Public Corporations (Annex 9) and on Commissions to Preserve National Monuments (Annex 8). Each agreement provides for the establishment of a very important commission. In Annex 9 this is, according to Article 1(1), a Commission on Public Corporations, and in Annex 8, according to Article 1, a Commission to Preserve National Monuments. Each Commission is composed of five members, of which two (in each) will be internationally appointed representatives: the former appointed by the President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Annex 9, Article 1(2)) and the latter appointed by the Director-General of UNESCO (Annex 8, Article 2(1)).
What is controversial about this? In itself, of course, nothing. In light of present conditions in Bosnia it is inevitable that if national monuments are to be restored and maintained, and communications restored, that direct international involvement will be necessary. However, I truly feel that these two Commissions could provide, if applied too freely elsewhere, excellent illustrations of the over-internationalisation effect of Dayton. I am not, in any way, suggesting that direct international involvement in such Commissions is harmful, but would it be necessary for the 'three'? There are so many mechanisms in modern international life for the international community to 'monitor ... maintain ... coordinate ... facilitate', I feel we should avoid the habit of 'over-participation' (Annex 10, Article 2(e)). In the case of national monuments, following any settlement, couldn't UNESCO perhaps set up temporary offices in each of the 'three' and assist, indirectly, in the facilitation of designation (and/or repair). In answer to the charge that indirect involvement could threaten such designation (and/or repair), one should consider that while, according to Article 5(4), '[decisions of the Commission shall be final and enforceable in accordance with domestic law', in paragraph (5) it merely (permissively) states:
'In any case in which the Commission issues a decision designating property as a National Monument, the Entity in whose territory the property is situated, a) shall make every effort to take appropriate, legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures necessary for the protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of the property, and b) shall refrain from taking any deliberate measures that might damage the property'.
Can one, despite direct involvement, be satisfied with the phrases (merely) 'shall make every effort' and 'deliberate measures'? What, for example, is an 'undeliberate measure'? The work of the Commission on Public Corporations, as provided for in Annex 9, is a matter which I feel, at least in the case of the 'three', could be better facilitated without the need of a single, specific, commission. The Commission on Public Corporations is weakened, in Dayton, by the lack of information concerning its role/function/mandate. We are informed that one is established in Article 1(1), and that it will 'examine establishing. . . joint public facilities' in areas such as 'energy, postal communication facilities'. We are also informed of its composition, but we are told little else. I am sure, over a period, in Nagorno-Karabakh, bilateral agreements with the Republic of Azerbaijan could be signed regulating the supply/sale of energy resources, with postal communication agreements being reached enabling letters/parcels (etc.) to be sent directly to Karabakh, or, in certain other cases from Armenia (or even, if so desired, from the Republic of Azerbaijan). For the 'United Republic of Georgia', energy and communications would be exercised, according to para. 87 of my recommendations, 'by the governments/governing bodies of the respective Republics/Regions and Union Government jointly'. In respect of the Transportation Corporation, as provided for in Article 2 ('to organise and operate transportation facilities, such as roads, railways and ports, for their mutual benefit'), in Nagorno-Karabakh and the 'United Republic of Georgia' (perhaps with the exception of ports) very much the same procedure could apply: by way of agreements/governmental liaison. What is more problematic, however, is the question of the fixing and collecting (as per Article 2(3)) of 'rates, fees, rentals and other charges for the use of (such) facilities'. This is particularly germane in respect of the use/regulation of ports. As, according to para. 88 of my recommendations, The Republics/Regions shall enjoy exclusive competence' over over 'ports' (inter alia), this is a matter that would be regulated by the republican government of Abkhazia.

BEYOND DAYTON AND GHALI

The Aland Islands
Of all the existing autonomies, the level of autonomy enjoyed by the Aland Islands is often singled out as a 'beacon of light' to be emulated.
The Aland Islands are most frequently spoken of as a possible model upon which to base any settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Indeed, the negotiations have even been conducted there. While this premise contains certain truths, it equally contains a number of untruths. While, as I have already indicated, the aspiration for Nagorno-Karabakh should be demilitarisation, this will not be attainable for some considerable time: neutrality may be more achievable. My recommendations advocate self-governing status for Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the Aland Islands are not truly self-governing. Finland still maintains responsibility, (even) according to the (latest) Autonomy Act (of 1993) in such areas as foreign policy, most aspects of civil law, courts of justice and criminal law, customs policy and monetary services. Aland does not have its own currency (although it does have extensive budgetary powers), let alone its own reserves. Further, my recommendations do not envisage any form of legislative representation for Karabakh in the Milli Majlis (Parliament of Azerbaijan). Most certainly Karabakh would never, under any circumstances, agree to the Republic of Azerbaijan 'appointing' a Governor to 'watch over' the republic. It would appear, therefore, that there are little/no points of potential commonality. Of course, this is not true. In theory, all the 'above' could be applied in Karabakh (particularly); and perhaps the most feasible would be the introduction of regional citizenship.
Aland islanders enjoy Finnish citizenship, but they also possess their own regional 'citizenship'. Regional citizenship is a prerequisite for an individual to vote/stand in elections, own and hold real estate, carry on business. While it is acquired at birth, if one of the parents possess Aland citizenship, only Finnish citizens may acquire it, and 'outsiders' may only acquire it upon 5 years permanent residence and demonstration of a 'satisfactory' knowledge of the Swedish language. Could Nagorno-Karabakh, similarly, introduce its own regional citizenship? In truth, I do not see why it couldn't, but there would have to be certain conditions. As in the case of Aland 'citizenship', regional citizenship in Karabakh
would have to be 'subordinate' (in status and effect) to the existing citizenship of the Republic of Azerbaijan. In no way could it be regarded as a parallel citizenship, either separate from or horizontal to that of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Further, there should be no language requirement to obtain regional citizenship. Merely permanent residence in the republic either prior to the outbreak of hostilities (and/or their offspring born since) or on the date of the signing of the agreement would be sufficient. Those born subsequently would qualify by way of their domicile in the region. Upon a settlement, for those displaced persons/ refugees, there should be no time limit upon which to re-settle and claim regional citizenship. Indeed, crucially, such a time limit could not be imposed as a means of barring their return. Regional citizenship in Karabakh would not be required to own/hold real estate or to carry on business, but it could be required to vote/stand in elections.
Could regional citizenship be an option in Abkhazia and South Ossetia? While it conceivably could, I do not think it should be preferred. Once again, one should consider the different relationship between Karabakh and Azerbaijan (proper) to that of Abkhazia/South Ossetia and Georgia (proper). For Abkhazia and South Ossetia regional citizenship would have a deleterious effect on restoration: it would cause animosity, tension, and, most of all, confusion. Besides, wouldn't those living in the Republic of Aj aria seek it and what would the effect be if the Republic of Georgia adopted its own variant? Regional citizenship probably works only for a single 'entity' within a single country, not more.

Andorra
The example of Andorra should also be considered. Its situation as being under the joint sovereignty (or dual protectorate) of France and Spain identifies it, from the outset, more closely with Karabakh than Abkhazia or South Ossetia. If the Andorra model were applied for these latter two, the natural question would arise as to who would form the 'protector'. Georgia, naturally, would never consider Russia assuming such a 'garb' and I do not believe North Ossetia or even the Council of Caucasian Mountain Peoples (see Chapter 12) could provide adequate 'substitutes'. Indeed, the relationship would be very 'lop-sided'. For Karabakh, however, there are perhaps greater possibilities. Undoubtedly, in theory, it could come under the dual protection of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, but what of the substance?
The possibility of the operation of two currencies. Such a system has been operating in Andorra for some considerable time. Sadly, however, the dram and the manat are not the same as the franc and the peseta. The operation of two currencies would be beset with problems. First, possession of either would form too graphic an indication of loyalty to either community. Once again, as in the case of my example of the effects of using a single currency (with differently designed bank notes and coinage) in the 'United Republic of Georgia', different currencies in Karabakh would have a deleterious effect on 'restoration'. Second, how could circulation of the two currencies be administered? The likely 'flooding' of money into the region would be likely to engender not just hyper-inflation (if only on the regional level), but could also effect a monetary crisis that could only lead to devaluation. Third, the dram and the manat do not operate in a 'rouble zone' environment, to shield either currency from 'wild' fluctuations in its value. Neither currency, unlike the Belarusian rouble, has been pegged either to any other currency or any fixed rate of exchange. Fourth, in the event of devaluation, this could have a negative effect on what would, in effect, be the 'existing' purchasing power parity. Surely the revaluation of one would inevitably lead to the revaluation of the other.
Of course, the Andorra model could have ramifications beyond merely the financial (monetary aspect). Could Karabakh's defence ever, conceivably, come under the dual 'guarantee' of both Armenia and Azerbaijan? I do not believe two armies, in consideration of the recent past, could ever function (in harmony) on Karabakh soil. The inevitable shocks that would occur between the two communities could only lead Karabakh being torn apart under the weight of such a 'guarantee'. At what point would either 'army' intervene? It is doubtful that agreement, be it 'hypothetical' or 'actual', could ever be reached on this point and, if anything could, in the end, merely, facilitate unilateral intervention. A dual 'guarantee' in defence suggests the existence of a third 'power' which could endanger the sovereignty and integrity of the (country/) region and which, therefore, the dual protectors might need, necessarily, to protect themselves from. Thus, it is, perhaps, only on the executive level that Andorra could provide an example to any of the 'three'. While the model of 'co-princes' (the President of France and the Spanish bishop of Ses de Urgel) would not seem particularly relevant, the possibility of, for example in the case of Karabakh, the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan appointing respective heads of government (vegeurs) could not be ruled out. This is where Tofig Zulfugarov's (the newly appointed Azerbaijani Foreign Minister) idea for two administrative centres in Karabakh, one Azeri, in Shusha, the other Armenian, in Stepanakert,
could come into operation. On paper such looks a possibility. However, one should be aware that it would never be supported by Stepanakert (nor, almost certainly, Yerevan). Further, would executive functions be operated jointly or separately (in whole or in part). If separately (to what extent), then, inevitably at some stage, territorial factors would emerge, which would lead to the cantonisation (almost on a village level) of Karabakh. Such administrative separation may have been proved workable (albeit on a much-larger scale) in Switzerland, but I am extremely doubtful as to its possible effectiveness in Karabakh and, besides, it has proved to be a complete disaster in the (mainly Muslim and Croat) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Chapter 10). Executive duality could, of course, similarly, be operated in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but would lead to exactly the same problems (/dangers).

San marino
Andorra is not the only 'principality' in Europe to have joint heads of state (/government). San Marino has a very similar executive 'structure' in the form of its (two) Captains Regent. The fundamental problem with duality is (San Marino uses the Lire, but mints its own coins), of course, human nature. The 'metaphor' that is the 'throne' has, throughout history, had a very individualist connotation. In truth, human beings are not very good at sharing power and I rather suspect, as Andorra and San Marino imply, that it only works well (or at least adequately) when the degree of executive power (that can be wielded) is (without wanting to insult those from either) so inconsequential as not to matter very much. When the executive is largely 'ceremonial' the possibilities for duality exist. 'Sadly', such a state of affairs (convention, even) most certainly does not prevail in any of the 'three'. Emotionally and psychologically 'each' are at divergent poles. This is before even the equation of separate ethnicity is brought in. While, conceivably, therefore, models such as Andorra's or San Marino's could be an aspiration, at best they should be very distant ones.

ASSOCIATION
Management of the UN Trusteeship System has ensured an 'association' between the notion of self-government and associated statehood. The matter of the meaning of the phrase 'self-government' arose in connection with the obligation of the administering States, under the System, to transmit under Article 73(e) of the UN Charter, information relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the non-self-governing territories.
On the basis of a working paper prepared by the United Nations Secretariat, the Special Committee on Information, in 1951, transmitted a report to the General Assembly on 'factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a territory is self-governing'. The report concluded that no single factor or combination of factors could be regarded as predominant or decisive for every case [14].
Pursuant to a further study, conducted by an Ad Hoc Committee (conceived and appointed by the General Assembly), in 1952, France pointed out the existence of an intermediary stage, 'at which a territory may have ceased to be non-self-governing in the meaning of the Charter without being an independent State'. It was then added: 'It is that stage which should be defined' [15]. The United Kingdom, emphasising that self-government and independence were distinct, ventured: '... a full measure of self-government ... [inter alia] will enable the executive branch of the Government of that people to be selected and deposed by no other agency than the collective will of the individuals comprising that people, exercised in accordance with the constitution of the territory concerned' [16]. The Philippines, objecting to the France/United Kingdom thesis, noted that such a distinction could lead 'to the classification of all conceivable types and gradations of self-government and the arbitrary selection of certain types and grades as constituting a full measure of self-government'. This would present an opportunity to 'freeze' a territory somewhere before attaining its ultimate goal: independence [17].
Following the appointment of a second Ad Hoc Committee, in 1953, the United States concluded that it was not feasible to construct a definition of a full measure of self-government which could be 'precise, absolute and all inclusive': it was difficult to predict 'the exact form which eventual self-government may take' [18].
Despite the undoubted 'flexibility' of the notion of 'self-government' and the inability of the international community to agree on its scope (it had even been equated with independence [19]), its application, in the form of associated statehood, has been manifested in the territories that previously constituted the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was established further to United Nations Security Council Resolution 21, of 2 April 1947 [20]. It included: Ponape (then including Kusaie), Truk, Yap, Palau, the Marshall Islands and the Northern Mariana Islands. The United States assumed the role of Trustee. On 12 July 1978, following a Constitutional
Convention, the people of four of the former Districts of the Trust Territory, Truk (now Chuuk), Yap, Ponape (now Pohnpei) and Kusaie (now Kosrae) voted in a referendum to form a Federation, the Federated States of Micronesia. In January 1978, the Northern Mariana Islands became self-governing, in political union with the United States, under the terms of a Covenant negotiated between the two governments. The Marshall Islands 'reciprocated' by, in 1978, adopting its first constitution and, in 1979, officially becoming self-governing.
Between 1979-1986, the United States engaged in the process of transferring governmental functions to these 'three', culminating in the entering into force of relevant compacts of free association in 1986. According to the Compact of Free Association with the Republic of the Marshall Islands (entered into force 21 October 1986), the United States agreed to maintain responsibility for the Islands' defence and security, in return for its continued use of the missile testing range at Kwajalein Atoll. The United States undertook the same in respect of the Federated States of Micronesia, according to the Compact of Free Association (entered into force on 3 November 1986); and, additionally, in respect of foreign policy, with the Northern Mariana Islands, according to the Covenant Agreement, also of 3 November 1986.
The Marshall Islands, which has four embassies (in the United States, China, Fiji and Japan), and the Federated States of Micronesia were both admitted to the United Nations on 17 September 1991.
Beyond the American 'sphere', forms of association have also had a bearing on the Dutch realm and New Zealand.
The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba are both part of the Dutch realm. Full autonomy in internal affairs was granted to Netherlands Antilles in 1954 [21]. Aruba formed a part of the Netherlands Antilles until its separation from it in 1986, whereupon it was granted full autonomy in internal affairs. Defence and foreign policy, however, remained the responsibility of the Netherlands. New Zealand has undertaken the same in relation to the Cook Islands and Niue. Both are self-governing territories in free association with New Zealand, fully responsible for the management of internal affairs. The Cook Islands became self-governing in free association on 4 August 1965, and has the right at any time to move to full independence by unilateral action [22]. Niue became self-governing on 19 October 1974 [23]. While foreign policy is the responsibility of the New Zealand government, in respect of the Cook Islands, it is obliged to consult with its government in respect of its exercise.
'Self-governing status' is not new. Although the above are all, very much, aspects of the post-colonial environment and, perhaps, not directly amenable to comparison with the 'three', they do at least demonstrate that forms of association, when based upon consent, can work very much to the advantage of both sides.
I do not believe any 'equivalent' model is relevant to the 'three'. However, the notion of association is, without question, of some relevance to Nagorno-Karabakh. The relationship I have recommended between Baku and Stepanakert is an entirely horizontal one. Per se, defence and foreign relations would remain within the purview of Stepanakert; Stepanakert's position within the Republic of Azerbaijan would rest very much upon consent. 'Despite this', I am sure, over time, there would be a number of areas where the two would cooperate equally, if not even Stepanakert, for its own sake, choosing to cede certain powers/functions to Baku. Although my recommendations on Karabakh would not, at first glance, appear to suggest any kind of association, in truth, I believe what could, with good faith on both sides, be built over a period of time is such an association. While I would not deny that Stepanakert would look towards Yerevan for its political/economic (even social) inspiration, I find it hard to imagine that it would not want to construct relations with Baku.
The basis for my recommendations is to encourage processes of cooperation. It is not inconceivable that any of the 'three' may choose not to introduce (for example) their own currencies, or, at the very least, resolve to come (fully) within the Manat/Lari zone. Economic circumstances and, I am sure, benefit, could, ultimately, determine(/necessitate) such. Importance, therefore, lies in the ability to construct relations/build partnerships, rather than have them foisted upon them (compare with, for example, Bosnia and relations between the centre and the Entities; and, even, relations within the Federation).

DISCRIMINATION
There is always a danger that in promoting processes of constitutional settlement in 'disputed' regions, that undue stress can be placed on attempting to 'secure' the rights of the (local) 'titular' nation. In such conditions, it is too easy to overlook the rights of regionally non-dominant titular peoples and 'permanent' minorities living in the relevant region(/s). In order to ensure their rights, it will be necessary to construct a framework in the 'three' that will protect them from discrimination.
To help avoid any such eventualities, I believe principles contained in the Autonomy Statute of South Tyrol (first published on 31 August 1972) and in the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (signed on 18 March 1994) could be applied.
Article 56 of the Autonomy Statute provides:
'If a bill should be considered to violate the equal rights of the citizens of the different language groups or the ethnic and cultural characteristics of those groups, the majority of the Councilmen of one of the language groups in the Regional Council or in the Provincial Council of Bolzano/Bozen may call for a vote by language groups.
'In the event that the call for separate voting is not accepted, or should the bill be passed in spite of two-thirds of the members of the language group called for the vote voting against it, the majority of that group can impugn the law before the Constitutional Court within thirty days of its publication, for the reason stated in the preceding paragraph.
'The appeal does not suspend the force of the law' [24].
South Tyrol (Trentino-Alto Adige) constitutes one of twenty regions in Italy. Five of these enjoy special status, of which two (Trentino-Alto Adige and Fruili-Venezia Giulia) have treaty-based protections. The Region of South Tyrol was, according to the last census (conducted in the autumn of 1991), 68% German-speaking, 27.7% Italian speaking and 4.4% Latin-speaking. The Region of South Tyrol is divided into two Provinces, the mainly Italian-speaking Trento Province and the mainly German-speaking Bolzano-Bozen Province. According to the Statute (Article 24), the Region is (legislatively) administered by its Regional Council, which should (Article 25) reflect:
'the number of inhabitants of the Region, according to the most recent general population census, by 70 (the number of Councilmen) and distributing the seats in proportion to the population in each electoral district on the basis of integral quotients and largest remainders.
The territory of the Region is divided into the Provincial electoral districts of Trento and Bolzano/Bozen'.
Each Province is (legislatively) administered by its Provincial Council (Article 47). According to Article 48:
'Each Provincial Council is composed of the members of the Regional Council elected in the relevant Province'.
Article 56 is a potentially useful safeguard against legislative tyranny in the 'three'. Although I have not recommended the establishment of a Constitutional Court to resolve disputes within the 'United Republic of Georgia', nor, even, between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan (I believe it is too early, even in Georgia, to speak of such), I do believe that such a manner of 'complaint' could be 'introduced'. In the 'United Republic of Georgia' (and in Karabakh), any dispute could be addressed to the relevant Parliamentary Chairmanship, with the possibility that if the matter was not resolved within six months that the bill would be adopted, or, alternatively, after that period, it could be passed on to the State Council for another (maximum) six month period (in Karabakh. the matter could be 'resolved', 'subsequently', by the Prime Minister and his Deputies).
Naturally, there are enormous potential dangers in introducing such a system. Sadly, it could, all too frequently, be used as a political device to bring the operation of government to a halt. Such a danger would, therefore, have to be obviated by a (maximum) period of limitation(/ delay), similar to that 'enjoyed' by the House of Lords (vis-a-vis the House of Commons) in the United Kingdom, according to the Parliament Act of 1949: here, one parliamentary year (two sessions of parliament).
Such a procedure could have certain advantages. I believe it would make the governments of the 'three' less likely to propose fundamentally discriminatory legislation in the first place. The very real inconvenience of delay, and (indeed) the threat of legislative gridlock would, itself, act as a limiter. Further, it would facilitate truly active communication and discussion between the respective sides. Consequently, I am sure that such a (potential) procedure could only reduce the number of 'Article 56' instances arising.
The above could be bolstered by the introduction of an Ombudsman system and a Human Rights Court.
According to Article 1(1) of Chapter II (B) of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina [25], there shall be three Ombudsmen: 'one Bosniac, one Croat and one Other'. Their function is enshrined in Article 2(1):
The Ombudsmen are to protect human dignity, rights, and liberties as provided in the Constitution, in the instruments listed in the Annex thereto, and in the constitutions of the Cantons. In particular, they shall act to reverse the consequences of the violations of these rights and liberties and especially of ethnic cleansing'.
The constitutional position of the Ombudsmen is bolstered by Article 6(1):
'[further to his function] An Ombudsman is entitled to initiate proceedings in competent courts and to intervene in pending proceedings, including any in the Human Rights Court'.
The jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court; 'itself consisting of three judges (one Bosniac, one Croat and one Other, Article 18(t)); as per Chapter IV (C), is provided in Article 19:
'The competence of the Human Rights Court shall extend to any question concerning a constitutional or other legal provision relating to human rights or fundamental freedoms or to any of the instruments listed in the Annex .. .'
Legislative delay, to check potential abuse, is undoubtedly important, but it may be insufficient to protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals, of all nationalities, even the 'titular' one, in the 'three'. In the light of this, individual (as opposed to collective) protection could be afforded by petition to an Ombudsman or the institution of proceedings before a Human Rights Court. Once again, as with law enforcement, it will be essential, after any settlement, to maintain the confidence of (in the main, but not exclusively) returnees. Titularisation' in the 'three' should not be at the expense of ethnic Azerbaijanis/ Georgians (the regionally non-dominant titular peoples), nor the 'permanent' minorities. An Ombudsman system and a Human Rights Court, to a degree working in tandem, but certainly, at the very least, in parallel, would provide a much needed and significant aspect in confidence-building. In my opinion, such would also act as a necessary humbler for those constituting (officially or not) the Armenian/Abkhazian/Ossetian people.
In truth, no amount of 'guarantees' can maintain confidence or ensure harmony. The psychological destruction that prevails within and among the 'antagonists' will adhere for generations to come. What is essential, however, is to 'encourage' the means whereby such damage can be stabilised (/not aggravated further) and, ultimately, mitigated. New found freedoms can, tragically, so often be the new fetters/chains for others. Yet, this need not be the 'natural' corollary. While my recommendations provide much for the 'titular' peoples of the 'three', they should not be regarded as an excuse(/justification) for punishment.
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia should assume any new powers soberly. For with the trust that would be handed to them comes responsibility. Any settlement granting them rights similar to the ones I have recommended, would, without question, be at the expense of the entirely legitimate principles of countless thousand Azerbaijanis and Georgians. In a statesmanlike way, this should be reflected upon. For good faith and understanding will always have its limits.


NOTES
[1] (Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1353 gmt, 6 Jan. 1998) (SU/3119 B/12, 8 Jan. 1998).
[2] On 12 February 1996, the Military Collegium of the Azerbaijan Supreme Court passed a death sentence on Alikram Gumbatov, leader of the self-proclaimed Talysh-Mugan Republic, see: (Assa-Irada news agency, Baku, in English, 1433 gmt, 8 July 1993) (SU/1737 Cl/2, 10 July 1993): Two injured in protests over Lenkoran's self-proclaimed independence'.
[3] It should be noted that while Armenia and Georgia are both parties to the First Optional Protocol (of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), Azerbaijan is not. HR/CT/494, 11 April 1997.
[4] Signed at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, 21 November 1995. For text see: http://www.bosnianembassy.org/dayton/index.shtml
[5] In June 1992, newly appointed UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali invited the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities for discussions on a new initiative, the 'Set of Ideas on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus'. Five meetings were held in New York, between 18-23 June 1992. However, they proved fruitless. Despite the Ideas' 're-introduction' during talks in the spring of 1997, agreement has still not been reached between the two sides. For text of the 'Set of Ideas' see: Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/24472, 21 August 1992.
[6] for Texts of Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance (both of 1959), see: http:// www.kypros.org/Cyprus.Problem/treaty.phpl
Treaties: Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey; and, Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.
[7] See: http://www.bosnianembassy.org/dayton/gfa-an.4.shtml
[8] Tianeti is in northern Georgia. It had an ethnic Georgian population of approximately 90% in 1989.
[9] Formerly part of German East Africa, Britain obtained a mandate under the League of Nations to administer Tanganyika in 1919. Zanzibar had been a British Protectorate since 1890. Tanganyika gained independence in 1961, Zanzibar in 1962. On 26 April 1964, union between the two led to the formation a united republic. The name Tanzania was adopted on 29 October 1964.
[10] The Javakhk popular movement of ethnic Armenians, in Samtskhe-Javakheti province (southern Georgia), renewed their calls for autonomy for 'Akhalkalaki District', on 22 August 1998. This followed ethnic Armenian residents, in the town of Akhalkalaki, having prevented Georgian troops from conducting military exercises in the area, on 12 August. (Kavkasia-Press news agency, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 1440 gmt, 22 August 1998) and (Noyan Tapan, Yerevan, in Armenian, 14 August 1998)
Regarding the Azerbaijani populated districts of southern Georgia, see: (Akhali Taoba, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 10 Jan. 1998, p.2)
[11] See Chapter 1.
[12] According to the 1989 Soviet census, the Jewish Autonomous Region was only 4.2% Jewish. 83.2% of the population was Russian, 7.4% were Ukrainian. The Jewish Autonomous Region (sometimes referred to as Birobidzhan) is in the Russian Far East.
[13] Further to the Montreux Convention of 1936, free and safe passage is guaranteed to international shipping through the Bosphorus straits. Article 1 provides: The High Contracting Parties recognise and affirm the principle of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits. The exercise of this freedom shall henceforth be regulated by the provisions of the present Covenant'. For text see: <http:// www.geocities.com/Athens/Aegean/2910/s973.php>
[14] 6GAOR, Supp.l4(A/1836), at pp. 5-6,41-43.
[15] UN Doc. A/AC.58/l/Add.2, p. 4 at 7-8(12 June 1952).
[16] UN Doc. A/AC.58/l/Add.3, at 17-22(16 July 1952).
[17] UN Doc. A/AC.58/1 /Add.4, p. 2 at 5 (25 July 1952).
[18] UN Doc. A/AC.67/2, at 37-40 (8 May 1953).
[19] A Sub-Committee of the General Assembly had, for example, in 1951, separated the 'factors indicative of the attainment of independence or other separate system of self-government' from the 'factors indicative of the free association (whether in a federal or unitary relationship) of a territory on equal status with other component parts of the metropolitan or other country'. UN Doc. A/C.4/L.180 and Corr. 2 (22 December 1951), 6 GAOR, Annexes, a.i. 36, p. 3 at 6.
[20] S/RES/21 (1947), 2 April 1947.
[21] Further to the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1954). For text see: H. Hannum (ed.), Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp. 353-377.
[22] The relationship between New Zealand and the Cook Islands was defined by New Zealand, in August 1965, to the United Nations as follows:
The Cook Islands people, because of their many natural links with New Zealand, have determined to exercise their right of self-government or self-rule or independence - call it what you will - but not at this time as a separate, sovereign State.
They have worked out a form of full self-government in free association with New Zealand, but - and here is the special feature - they may at any time in future, if they so desire, move into full independence, or any other status that may become practicable, by a unilateral act, that is, one which New Zealand has denied itself power to countermand. The right is spelled out in the provisions of article 41 of the Constitution ...
This new status is not sovereign independence in the juridicial sense, for the Cook Islanders wish to remain New Zealand citizens and in the meantime they wish New Zealand to discharge the responsibilities in the field of external affairs and defence in consultation with them; but it means that the Cook Islanders have a continuing right to self-determination. Henceforth the legal links between the Cook Islands and New Zealand rests on consent; this is what we understand by 'free association". Quoted at: http://www.ck/govt.php
[23] Further to the adoption of the Niue Constitution Act of 1974. For text see: H. Hannum (ed.), Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, pp. 401-420.
[24] Ibid, pp. 462-495 at 480.
[25] For Text of the Constitution of the Federation see: http://www.bihfedomb.org/eng-cons/constit.php

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